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As Federal Troops began pulling out of the South in 1877, steps made towards full
enfranchisement of black southerners, competitive elections, and representative democracy
collapsed. Over the course of the next fifty years, white “Redeemers” established a
sub-national authoritarian regime that encompassed nearly the entire formerly Confederate
South – reasserting the rule of political and economic white supremacy. Although
Redeemers ultimately succeeded in their attempts to establish an authoritarian system of
government under the Democratic party label, the effectiveness of their tactics varied
throughout the region. Analyzing an original dataset of congressional elections returns
from 1870 to 1920, I uncover significant variation in the rate and extent of democratic
backsliding throughout the South. I use historical census data to measure the effect of
education, racial composition, legacy of slavery, institutional reforms, and economic
systems on the rate of democratic collapse. My findings suggest that racial and partisan
factors motivated democratic collapse, and that institutional reforms such as the poll tax
and white primary elections merely formalized and further entrenched an already ongoing
process of authoritarian encroachment.
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INTRODUCTION
“Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that, exactly, is what this
convention was elected for!’
– Alabama convention leader, quoted in Hackney, Populism to Progressivism, p. 253
As Alabama’s Constitutional Convention of 1901 neared resolution, the inclusion of a
‘grandfather clause,’ a loophole inserted for white citizens to avoid the mechanisms enacted to
disenfranchise black Alabamians, remained the primary object of division among convention
delegates. The small minority of delegates opposed to including the grandfather clause were led
by (former) Alabama Governor John Oates, a politician backed by the Bourbon (conservative)
Democrats and the black belt’s planter upper-class. Despite his political allegiances, Oates’s
opposition to including the grandfather clause, the most explicitly racist mechanism of
disenfranchisement, was not out of benevolence to or concern for black voters. Rather, Oates’s
reasoning was pragmatic, weighing his goals motivated by partisan and racial dominance against
the costs of triggering a federal intervention.
Speaking from the convention floor, Oates said “It has been declared that the purpose
of this convention was to eliminate the negro from suffrage [voting], this is narrow. The purpose
was to redeem our beloved State from a condition into which we have fallen by dishonest
elections. The negro is here and is a voter by no act of his own. It was the policy of the
Republican party to free him and give him suffrage, and it was but natural that the negro should
be grateful” (Inp). These comments highlight the complex nature of the forces motivating
Redeemers—reasserting political control was the obvious outcome of their efforts, but whether
they acted out of anger towards the federal government, black voters, or Republicans is unclear
and has not been examined empirically. Oates and the other opponents of the grandfather clause
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opposed its inclusion in the new Constitution not because of its obvious racial component, but
because they feared the clause would invoke intervention from the federal courts. Indeed, much of
Redemption focused on removing federal influence from southern politics.
For Oates and his allies, ridding Alabama of Republican influence was the primary goal,
legal protection for white supremacy was not controversial, but as the Washington Post coverage
remarked, “Oates said he would admit some negroes [to vote] in preference to some white men”
(Pos, 1901). The historical record of Redemption—the process by which democrats throughout
the South retook political control from black, Republican, and Populist majorities—is complex.
Redemption was a prolonged reaction to Reconstruction, which rapidly upended the antebellum
racial, economic, and political hierarchies by enfranchising nearly a million previously enslaved
black voters and challenged the economic dominance of the landed planter class. Like Oates,
redeemers throughout the South sought to restore the antebellum hierarchies by consolidating
power within a one-party Democratic political regime. Over the half-century following the Civil
War, they would do exactly that with remarkable success.
While the end of sub-national authoritarian1 rule in the late 20th century has been well
documented (Vallely, 2005; Gibson, 2013; Mickey, 2015; Katznelson, 2013), less understood are
the processes by which a competitive two-party system transformed into a one-party regime
supporting Redeemers’ political control. Redemption, the most thorough process of democratic
backsliding in American history, serves as a case in which authoritarianism took hold via a path
not predicted by the framers of the Constitution. The safeguards in the Constitution designed
specifically to protect citizens from disenfranchisement—administration of elections as a power
reserved for the States (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.; Hamilton et al. (2009))—in this case served to
1For my purposes, I define authoritarianism broadly. That is, I use the term to refer to a system of
government in which a portion of the electorate is systematically prohibited from voting.
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accelerate the fall of democratic elections.
A better understanding of the course of Redemption, of why and how elections were
subverted, furthers our understanding of two subjects critically important to scholars of American
political development. First, the deconstruction of American democracy did not require a
tyrannical ruler or majority faction—possibilities entertained by the framers—Redemption, our
most vivid case of widespread disenfranchisement, was achieved by means not foreseen by the
framers. Second, recent scholarship on the congressional politics of the mid-twentieth century
(Katznelson and Mulroy, 2012; Katznelson, 2013; Schickler, 2016; Katznelson, 2018) has taken for
granted the blanket statement that southern congressional elections after Reconstruction were
completely unfree from roughly 1890-1965; this paper illustrates why this story is much more
complicated.
Using an original dataset combining historical congressional elections and demographic
data, this paper investigates why the competitive two-party system developed during
Reconstruction in the southern states failed in the years after Reconstruction. By exploiting the
variation in the decline of competitive congressional elections and levels of voter turnout from
1870-1920, I investigate the conditions that accelerated, and in some cases prevented, the collapse
of competitive elections.
In the next section, I provide a brief overview of how political scientists have thus far
treated Reconstruction and Redemption as political histories and the need to connect the two
phenomena. I then survey the extant literature on the processes of Redemption, explain my




If Reconstruction were to be regarded as a failure2, then the historical record would indicate that
democracy and egalitarianism progressed linearly in the United States, beginning with the
Emancipation Proclamation and culminating in the Civil Rights Movement. This interpretation,
thoroughly discredited by DuBois (Du Bois, 1935)3, excuses and oversimplifies the violent
resistance to egalitarianism present throughout American history (Vallely, 2005). Instead, a
thorough treatment of Reconstruction and Redemption as a process of democratization and
authoritarian resurgence provides ample material for a study of democratic backsliding in the
Untied States.
The collapse of competitive democratic elections in the South after Reconstruction
constitutes the most extensive case of territorial democratization and subsequent backsliding
within a developed and continuous democratic regime (Vallely, 2005; Gibson, 2013). The process
of redeeming the South, which required the subversion of democratic elections, was essentially a
reaction to the upheaval and revolution of Reconstruction. The disintegration of democratic
elections was only possible because of how rapidly and dramatically Reconstruction had
transformed the South. Indeed, the magnitude of Redemption’s effect on southern politics was
made possible only by the incredible progress achieved during Reconstruction.
2For a summary of this school of thought, see Fairclough (2012)
3C. Vann Woodward (1951) went so far as to argue that many blacks lived on roughly equal footing
with lower class whites for roughly two decades after the Civil War. It was this level of previous equality,
Woodward argued, that made demagogic racism so necessary for the reassertion and maintenance of white
power in the early twentieth century.
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Not until W.E.B Dubois published Black Reconstruction in America (Du Bois, 1935),
did political scientists begin to take seriously the efficacy of Reconstruction’s reforms—and the
significance of its subsequent undoing. DuBois’s research focused on the contributions made by
Slaves—and subsequently formerly enslaved people—to the economic and political upheaval in
the South during and after the Civil War. DuBois’s work pushed back against the idea that
Reconstruction was largely a failure of Republican partisanship gone awry, a narrative dominant
in the years prior to the publication of Black Reconstruction in America.
Although Radical Republicans did push forcefully for stronger Reconstruction
legislation against the wishes of most Democrats and some moderate Republicans (Foner, 1988),
the reforms were not initially failures. Broadly, the measures repudiated the approach taken by
President Johnson, who sought a quick reintegration of Confederate states by handing power back
to antebellum powers. Radical Republicans intervened by passing more aggressive measures,
beginning the much more effective era of Congressional Reconstruction. Black voter registration
rose from virtually zero to around 85-94 percent throughout the South (Mickey, 2015). Black
Codes, the predecessor to Jim Crow Era legislation, enacted in several southern states by early
Democratic majority governments without resistance by the Johnson Administration, backfired.
Radical Republicans in Congress responded with increasingly stringent civil rights legislation and
by requiring ratification of liberal state constitutions as prerequisite for readmission into Union
(Mickey, 2015).
However, the administrations in southern states, Republican or Democrat, failed to
provide the economic and political structure necessary for broad post-war growth. Newly
franchised voters supported insurgent Radical Republicans, Populists, Fusion Tickets, and
Greenbackers (Hofstadter, 1955). Working closely with a coalition of Radical Republicans in
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Congress, non-Democratic parties took majorities away from Southern Democrats in the early
1870s. Subsequently, competitive elections with at least two parties became the norm (Foner,
1988).
Congressional Reconstruction also dramatically altered the economic and social
landscape of the South. The newly authorized Freedmens’ Bureau distributed medical aid and
training, built schools, and provided financial assistance and food to millions of formerly enslaved
blacks (Col; Cimbala, 2003; Farmer-Kaiser, 2010). Congressional Reconstruction also ameliorated
economic conditions for some blacks, but vehement opposition to land distribution defanged the
Freedmens’ Bureau attempts to end the sharecropping structure quickly established during the
interregnum between the Civil War and Congressional Reconstruction.
It was in this environment, one of tumult, federal intervention, and a rapidly expanding
electorate that the Southern Redemption movement began. Despite the intentions of Redeemers
to quickly disassemble the fledgling state democracies, competitive elections remained the
norm—the transition from democracy to sub-national authoritarian regime moved slowly
(Woodward, 1951, 1991; Kousser, 1974; Bensel, 1987, 1990). Redeemers would ultimately be
successful, but many of Reconstruction’s achievements proved to be more entrenched than others.
To formulate expectations for the processes by which Redemption occurred, it is first necessary to
take into account what the South became after Redemption took its course.
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THE SOUTH REDEEMED
Beginning with V.O. Key’s Southern Politics, the particular system of one-party rule developed
during the first half-century in the South has been the subject of many thoughtful treatments on
democratization and party politics. However, political scientists lack consensus on the essential
question of what the South became after Redemption. Gibson (2013) argues that the South
transitioned from a democracy during Reconstruction to a territorial sub-national system of
authoritarianism. Gibson argues that boundary control, the capacity of southern states to resist
federal intervention, allowed the South to remain semi-autonomous. Further, within the
boundaries of the sub-national regimes, Gibson argues that a high level of coordination was
needed between the southern states to enact regime change.
Mickey (2015) conceptualizes the Southern Democratic regimes differently, instead of a
coordinated effort between states, Mickey focuses on the unique trajectories of each state. While
a majority of southerners may have voted together as a bloc in congress, the states varied in the
tactics adopted to establish one-party control. Moreover, Mickey points to the variation in degree
of authoritarianism within states—more evidence that a continuous system of sub-national
authoritarianism was not universally achieved.
Despite preceding them, Key’s original treatment (1949) bridges the two more recent
accounts (Gibson, 2013; Mickey, 2015). Key’s primary subject matter was the variation in
political systems between the southern states, but he carefully noted that the entire system’s
viability depended on the capacity of southern members of Congress to dominate the National
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Democratic Party as a cohesive group. Despite differences in conceptualizing the operation and
coordination of the Authoritarian South, treatments of the South during this period generally
agree on why the system of sub-national authoritarianism died, and to a certain extent, how it
operated.
Although primary elections did in some cases produce quasi-representative congressional
elections (Caughey, 2018), by the mid-twentieth century southern states sent, overwhelmingly,
congressmen to Washington who represented the economic and social elite—interests identical to
or closely aligned with the antebellum centers of power (Key Jr., 1949; Gibson, 2013; Mickey,
2015; Schickler, 2016). While many Southern Democrats in Congress did face primary challenges,
usually in campaigns centering around economic and social welfare policies (not about race)
(Katznelson, 2013), it is taken for granted that these elections were not open and free. Indeed,
what Redemption eventually produced was a system by which a small portion of the eligible
voting population, disproportionately wealthy and white, selected would-be congressmen in
Democratic primary elections.
Less understood, however, is how sub-national authoritarianism came to replace the
competitive partisan elections developed during Reconstruction. By understanding how the
system of sub-national authoritarianism came into being, political scientists can better
understand exactly what it became. Understanding the process of Redemption serves to improve
understanding of this case of democratic backsliding, but also sheds light on the question of




Although Democrats began to seize control of state governments throughout the 1870’s,
Congressional Reconstruction effectively ended with the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877. The
compromise awarded Republican Rutherford B. Hayes the Presidency in a contested election
against Democrat Samuel Tilden in exchange for an informal agreement to withdraw the
remaining federal troops from southern states. Over the fifty years following the Hayes-Tilden
Compromise of 1877, rates of black voting decreased from over 90 percent to near total
disenfranchisement. Closely contested elections with levels of turnout higher than any period in
U.S history were gradually replaced with one-party contests that frequently turned out less than
one percent of the eligible voting population. Although many Reconstruction Era reforms would
endure for years to come, the compromise symbolically ended Reconstruction, it also foreshadowed
the pattern of Southerner Congressmen making federal concessions in exchange for increased local
and state control—an exchange that would be repeated several times over(Peskin, 1973).
In attempting to synthesize the history of how Reconstruction was undone, DuBois
(1935) argued that analysis of the white response to Reconstruction required an intersectional
approach. In the South, Dubois argued, factions and cleavages delineated by class could not be
understood without race—and racial divisions needed to be viewed in a lens that accounts for the
particular relationship between race, economy, and geography. Any particular aspect of the South
cannot be understood outside of the larger racial political-economy. To varying degrees,
subsequent accounts have risen to this challenge.
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W.J. Cash (1941) frames disenfranchisement, and Redemption generally, as an economic
conflict instigated by the agrarian-elite planter class attempting to solidify control over workers
movements. Cash argues that Redemption originated in the cotton belt as a movement built to
restore antebellum power centers—critically, this antebellum system served to create a unified
southern delegation to protect chattel slavery at the federal level. Cash argues that southern
solidarity was once again necessary at the federal level to protect new systems of white
supremacy. Cash’s portrayal frames race as a tool utilized by agrarian and urban elites4,
Redeemers, to subjugate formerly enslaved blacks and working-class whites. Broadly, Cash argues
that elites fomented animosity between working-class whites and blacks to prevent working-class
solidarity and multi-racial political alignment. Populist movements, Cash argues, could not
overcome the spectre of black empowerment wielded by elites over working-class whites.
While subsequent accounts haven’t refuted that in certain cases race did serve as a tool
to further economic goals, Strong (1944) notes that disenfranchisement often occurred in
circumstances devoid of race. For instance, Democrats in Texas sought to impose a poll tax in
response to agrarian revolts occurring in areas with very small black populations. In this case,
economic elites disenfranchised white voters to secure the future of a particular economic
hierarchy. Strong selects this case to demonstrate that while racial concerns may have driven
disenfranchisement in the cotton-growing regions—centers of antebellum
power—disenfranchisement in the periphery of the South was driven less directly by race than
disenfranchisement in the cotton belt.
Moving further from racial and economic motives, Kousser (1974) argues that
4Cash’s description of southern elites differs here from that given by Woodward (1951). Whereas Wood-
ward argues that agrarian elites were generally replaced by new urban elites seizing control of Guilded Age
opportunities in manufacturing, utilities, and railroads, Cash contends that these elites were, if not the same
as the antebellum elites, closely aligned with them.
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partisanship drove disenfranchisement throughout the South. Reframing Redemption as a story
of partisanship, Kousser argues that disenfranchising measures were implemented most vigorously
in response to the fiercest competition. Populist insurgencies and well organized Republican
Party campaigns signaled a greater need for Democrats to subvert democratic reforms to
consolidate power. From this necessity, Democrats endorsed or actively participated in campaigns
of racial violence and intimidation to discourage voter turnout. In this frame, Democrats aligning
or receiving backing from particular economic interests or engaging in racial fear mongering were
doing just so—utilizing race and class as tools for partisan gain.
The literature on why Redemption occurred is clearly rich, but less is known about
where, when, and exactly how it occured. Although there is no shortage of broad observations
and anecdotal stories of vote buying, ballot stuffing, and political campaigns based on racial
violence, no systematic analysis of Redemption’s effect on Democracy exists. The history of
Redemption, a violation of the traditionally held view of American progress towards increasing
egalitarianism, violates a central observation and prediction made by Tocqueville in his writings
that suffrage concessions compound, that “no stop can be made short of universal suffrage”
(De Tocqueville, 1945). This paper investigates why Tocqueville was wrong.
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THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
The exact processes by which Reconstruction was violently undone is wholly understudied
(Gates Jr., 2020) despite the importance of Redemption as a case antithetical to the historical
memory of American history as consistent progress towards egalitarianism. Accounts of southern
disenfranchisement generally focus on one of two types of mechanisms utilized by Redeemers to
undo Reconstruction Era reforms. The first are institutional measures such as the poll tax,
literacy test, and adoption of the white primary—methods enacted through technically legal
procedures. Alternatively, Redeemers also used illegal, but often state acknowledged, terrorist
violence and intimidation. Although the sparse accounts of the tactics implemented by Redeemers
that do exist vary in the emphasis they place on various factions and methods for disenfranchising
much of the South, a clear picture of the South before and after Redemption allow for theorizing
about what happened during.
By the time Redeemers met in the first years of the twentieth century to pass new state
constitutions with institutional measures of disenfranchisement (poll taxes, literacy tests, etc.),
they commanded majorities in the state houses and held nearly all governorships. However, the
end of Reconstruction presented Redeemers with a dilemma: how to disenfranchise large portions
of the electorate without a governing majority. Whereas control of the legislatures and executive
branches of the states would allow Redeemers—nearly twenty-five years after Reconstruction—to
disenfranchise through legal measures, taking back those majorities and offices had to be the first
goal.
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I argue that the solutions to this dilemma were campaigns of violence and intimidation.
Redeemers struck a balance between disenfranchising their electorate to achieve governing
control—their primary aim—and staying within the bounds delineated by what the federal
government would tolerate. Recalling the words of Governor Oates, the memory of federal
invervention in response to the black codes enacted soon after the Civil War weighed heavily on
the minds of Redeemers. A key distinction to make, however, is that the Redeemers feared
intervention from the Judicial System reacting to legal measures—while the federal government
would consider anti-lynching legislation numerous times over the course of Redemption, no
meaningful legislation would ever pass to curb racist violence during the years of Redemption5.
The campaigns of violence, uncontested by the federal government, were necessary to
implement the “legal” reforms. For this reason, I expect racial campaigns of violence to depress
turnout and electoral competitiveness prior to the enactment of institutional reforms.
Subsequently, I expect institutional reforms to take place after Redeemers consolidated
Democratic majorities. The relationship hypothesized is thus one that depends on the
mechanisms of Federalism. I hypothesize that Redeemers utilized racial violence and intimidation
as well as ballot stuffing (and other similar tactics) because the federal government would not
intervene in these areas, whereas they had forced the repeal of black codes and other illiberal legal
reforms. Thus, hypothesis 1: decline of competitive elections and decreases in voter turnout will
mostly occur before institutional disenfranchising reforms.
I also test preexisting arguments for why and where disenfranchisement occurred. Cash
(1941) argued that Redeemers were motivated by racial animosity, if this were the case, I expect
to find that disenfranchisement occurred earlier and more completely in elections where black
5Congressman Leonidas Dyer (D-MO) introduced anti-lynching legislation in 1918, but no bill would pass
through a Southern Democrat led Senate fillibuster until the 1950s.
13
voters made up a greater proportion of the electorate. Insofar as Redemption was a reaction to
the upheaval of the antebellum order and hierarchies, I expect to find that Redeemers were most
present and active in areas in which black populations posed the biggest threat to Redeemers
goals of reasserting the antebellum hierarchy (i.e, areas with larger black populations).
This expectation, that Redeemers would focus particularly on subverting elections in
districts and counties with high numbers of black voters, is also supported by racial-threat
hypothesis. According to the theory of racial-threat, increased competition or threat posed by a
minority group elicits a response of greater control and oppression from the majority group (Giles
and Hertz, 1994; Crawford et al., 1998; Welch and Payne, 2010). In the context of Redemption,
racial-threat hypothesis suggests that elites in areas with a higher black population would have
felt a greater threat from newly enfranchised black populations, and would therefore be more
motivated to disenfranchise blacks than they would be in a district or county with fewer blacks.
Hypothesis 2 claims that Redeemers focused efforts to subvert elections in districts and counties
with high numbers of black voters.
Alternatively, if, as Kousser (1974) argues, Redeemers were motivated by partisan goals,
I expect to find that turnout was depressed in response to high rates of voting for Republican or
Populist candidates. Partisan goals also took advantage of the opportunities afforded by the
federal governments inaction. Specifically, because the states themselves administered elections,
election theft, vote buying, etc. would have been a tactic used to secure partisan majorities
without necessarily triggering federal intervention. Thus, Redeemers may have focused efforts in
areas in which a non-Democratic candidate made an especially strong showing (either winning or
coming close to it) in the previous election. Hypothesis 3 claims that elections would be subverted
in response to successful non-Democratic candidates.
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Subverting fair and free elections also afforded Redeemers numerous other benefits
beyond simple political control. Competitive campaigns have been shown to to increase citizens’
participation, engagement and political learning—and these effects are substantial even years
after a competitive campaign (Evans et al., 2014). Competitive elections create engaged and
informed citizens, developments unsuited to establishing a non-democratic regime. Competitive
elections also create more responsive and higher performing legislators (Konisky and Ueda, 2011),
conditions less suitable to legislators working to disenfranchise large portions of their electorates.
Not only do I expect Redeemers to respond to competitive elections because competition
challenges their capacity to assert political control, but also because competitive elections
themselves breed a more informed, active, and demanding constituency.
I expect to find minimal effects of institutional reforms. Because enacting poll taxes,
ballot reform, literacy tests, etc. required that Redeemers already have majority control of
government, the effect of those reforms ought to be minimal as most of the disenfranchising work
had already been accomplished. As Key (1949) wrote, “In Northern Discussion of Southern
Politics, the poll tax often plays the role of the chief villain. southern congressmen, according to
commentators, are reactionary because of the poll tax. The Democratic Party controls the South
because of the poll tax. Negroes suffer because of the poll tax. Poor whites are poor because of
the poll tax... All this sort of discussion does the poll tax too much honor” Nonetheless, I do
examine the possibility that the poll tax and literacy test may have still depressed turnout in
areas with high poverty and low literacy.
Finally, differences in regional economies and levels of education may have modified the
effects of disenfranchising efforts. In particular, I expect less poverty and higher rates of
manufacturing-based business to have mitigated the effects of institutional reforms. Level of
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income may have effected voting behavior in two ways. First, higher income generally corresponds
with higher levels of turnout. This relationship however, may be reversed if lower income counties
had more cases of vote buying. Theoretically, it would cost less money to buy the votes of more
impoverished voters.
Manufacturing businesses may have modified the effects of disenfranchising efforts
because they create the potential for easier organizing of labor. As V.O. Key observed (1949),
urban voters were much more likely to defect from establishment candidates if they did not
embrace progressive economic policies. Particularly, as the Democratic Party took up pro-labor
causes at the federal level, causes oftentimes opposed by Southern Democrats, this may have
altered the incentives for Democrats to encourage or discourage the organized labor to organize
politically, or to vote at all. Despite the fact that southern members of Congress may not have
wanted labor to vote, Key and others (1949; 2018) have made it clear that labor was able to vote.
Because labor could vote, this provided would-be challengers with a base of support if labor
interests opposed the incumbent candidate. For this reason, I expect a higher number of
manufacturing establishments to prevent voter suppression and increase the legitimacy of
elections. Thus Hypothesis 4 claims that an increase in manufacturing in a district and county
will lead to greater resistance to Democratic backsliding during presidential elections.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In order to measure the effect of various efforts by Redeemers to move from Democracy to a
system of subnational authoritarianism, I have created an original dataset of demographic and
economic variables measured at the county level paired with county and district level election
returns. County level data is drawn from the U.S Decennial Census. Election returns data are
drawn from ICPSR studies 1 and 8611. Incomplete data from these studies—district level returns
and pairing counties to congressional districts—were supplemented by Michael Dubin’s (1998)
United States Congressional elections, 1788-1997 and The historical atlas of United States
Congressional districts, 1789-1983 (Martis, 1983).
Measuring the collapse of democratic elections in the South in their entirety is far
beyond the scope of this project. However, congressional elections make a worthwhile subject for
various reasons. For one, the ferocity of competition in congressional elections during and
immediately after Reconstruction is well documented (Hofstadter, 1955). Further Southern
districts were represented by black men, an obvious signal6 that black citizens were voting and
had their wills represented by legislators. Congressional districts are also geographically
constrained, meaning that the election data from each district can be used to understand how
geographically constrained factors like racial composition, economic production, and level of
education impacted elections7. Finally, congressional elections proxy well for democracy in the
6A phenomenon that would take nearly another hundred years to be repeated after Redemption ended
their chances at reelection.
7Previous accounts such as this have been conducted primarily at the state level (Key Jr., 1949; Kousser,
1974), making this type of analysis impossible
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American case simply because of the weight placed on them by the Framers as a safeguard
against tyranny, but Congress’s function as the fundamental democratic institution rests on the
“assumption: elections—free, regular, and competitive—are the lifeblood of the institution”
(Quirk and Binder, 2005).
I use two primary dependent variables to measure the extent to which democratic
congressional elections collapsed: turnout, measured at the county level, and the Democratic
candidates’ share of the party vote—with 29,739 and 3,224 observations at each level,
respectively. While turnout regularly varies in elections that are still considered “democratic”, the
huge amount of variation between elections makes turnout a useful measure. If citizens are not
voting, they may still be functionally represented by a coincidence of interest, but this is not
guaranteed. Further still, low turnout signals to members of Congress that their constituents will
not be holding them accountable8. If elections are not producing legislators chosen by voters, who
do not share the interests of voters, they cannot be held accountable.
Depressed turnout alone is not enough to conclude that the South became less
democratic. In certain cases, turnout may be reported as having increased because ballots boxes
were stuffed, voters were bribed, or any other nefarious tactic was used. For this reason I also use
the share of the vote won by the Democratic Party in the congressional election. If a district with
a high black population, for example, reports high turnout and a large share of votes for a
Democrat, this is a clear signal that the election was unfair. It would be unimaginable for black
voters to freely cast their ballots in favor of the party actively seeking their disenfranchisement.
Historical analyses such as this one are severely restricted in accessible and reliable
data. Because systematically collected and accurate data are unavailable for racially focused voter
8To further make this point clear, I also use the competitiveness of an election and whether or not an
election was contested and find similar results throughout
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suppression campaigns of terror and violence, I use historical data on lynchings and slavery. The
historical legacy of slavery has been connected to contemporary political attitudes (Acharya
et al., 2016) and tracks with how dependent a given geographic location would have been on
antebellum hierarchies of power. Building on prior work in this area, I use the proportion of the
population that owned slaves as a variable in addition to the proportion of a given population
that was enslaved (both collected in the 1860 census). If contemporary attitudes are shaped by
slavery, I can expect the effect to be dramatically magnified as of the early twentieth century
compared to what it has become one hundred years later.
The data on lynchings come from Tolnay and Beck’s original collection (1995)
supplemented by Seguin and Ribgy’s (2019) collection. Although lynchings are only one extreme
example of racial violence and terror, I argue that there presence are sufficient to guarantee a
culture of racial intimidation. While lynchings may not have been a necessary or inevitable
outcome of racial terror and intimidation, in any case that a lynching did occur, I assume that
there was also a culture of racial intimidation. Given the significant data limitations, I argue that




The first question to address is to what extent, when, and where, competitive congressional
elections collapsed. Table 1 presents a summary view of the Democratic rise to dominance over
congressional elections. Reconstruction did indeed create an environment of intense partisan
competition. From 1870-1879, most states had a pattern of election returns that would be
considered normal (or perhaps more competitive) when compared to contemporary congressional
elections. Not until around 1900 did elections in somes states become overwhelmingly tilted
towards the Democratic Party. Further in states often considered peripheral to the South, such as
North Carolina, Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee, elections never truly became solidly
Democratic.
Table 1: MEDIAN DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARE BY STATE AND PERIOD
state 1870-1879 1880-1889 1890-1899 1900-1909 1910-1920
Alabama 0.54 0.64 0.59 0.83 0.97
Arkansas 0.54 0.58 0.71 0.68 0.82
Florida 0.49 0.54 0.76 0.85 0.85
Georgia 0.62 0.75 0.65 1.00 1.00
Kentucky 0.62 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.54
Louisiana 0.48 0.66 0.73 0.88 1.00
Mississippi 0.60 0.70 0.76 1.00 1.00
Missouri 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52
North Carolina 0.53 0.54 0.50 0.60 0.58
South Carolina 0.47 0.77 0.86 0.98 1.00
Tennessee 0.61 0.55 0.56 0.62 0.70
Texas 0.70 0.69 0.57 0.85 0.89
Virginia 0.49 0.51 0.56 0.69 0.80
The data presented in Table 1 also limit the extent to which the South during this
period can be considered a system of territorial subnational authoritarianism. By 1920, the only
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states in which Democrats consolidated complete political control were Alabama (nearly),
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Additionally, the rate at which Redeemers
consolidated political control in even this select group of states varied. By 1890-1899, the median
share of the vote won by Democrats in South Carolina was nearly ninety percent, but in Alabama
and Georgia the median share of the vote won by Democrats was fifty-nine and sixty, respectively.
This variation casts doubt on the theory that Redeemers were coordinating across states—and
that if they were coordinating, that the coordination was successful9.
Going beyond variation at the state level, another general question to answer is whether
or not race was a determining factor in where Redemption occurred. The expectation is that
Redeemers would have been most aggressive in subverting elections and disenfranchising voters in
districts with higher black populations. Figure 1 charts the rapid rise in power of the Democratic
Party in congressional elections over the course of the first two decades after Reconstruction
ended. Breaking down the elections by the district’s racial composition, two notable findings
emerge. First, in districts except those in the highest quartile of black district racial composition,
the Democratic Party never failed to win a majority of congressional elections in the South.
Second, in districts in the lowest quartile of black district racial composition, the Democratic
Party never truly established complete dominance. Indeed, in the whitest districts, Democrats
still only won a slight majority of elections as of 1920—although they would increase their
winning percentage in later years.
9An obvious pattern does emerge in that the states in which political control was most consolidated
compose the black belt. Reconsidering Gibson’s (2013) theory of a territorial subnational regime as restricted
to the black belt states may be a fruitful direction for future research
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The districts won by Republicans and Populists are over-represented in peripheral
southern states with smaller black populations such as Virginia and Missouri, to be sure, but the
trend exists nonetheless. However, this only demonstrates that Democrats were successful at
winning elections. A crucial aspect of the arguments made by Key and other observers of the
one-party South is that elections were, in the aggregate, not competitive. Again, non-competitive
elections signal not just that elections were won, but also that the election was unlikely to be
produce a responsive and accountable elected representative. Figure 2 presents the average share
of votes won by Democrats in congressional elections, grouped by the districts’ proportion of
black residents. The share won by Democrats is a useful measure for understanding collapsing
electoral competitiveness because large margins for Democrats signal that the Democratic didn’t
face a significant challenge to power—margins of less than fifty indicate that the Democrat lost
the election.
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Once again, districts in the upper quartiles of black population display a different trend
than those in the lower quartiles. Districts with a greater proportion of black residents voted
Democrats and Republicans/Populists into office in roughly equal proportion at the end of
Reconstruction. However, these same districts reached a lower level of electoral competitiveness
over the next fifty years, as average vote shares won by Democrats rose to over 80 percent, while
remaining somewhat competitive in the less racially diverse districts.
Districts with a higher proportion of black voters were the least likely to tolerate
competitive elections. Either ballot boxes were stuffed to deliver Democrats sweeping victories in
the districts with the highest proportion of black voters, or black voters were kept from the polls.
Whichever circumstance, districts with higher proportions of black voters produced the least
competitive elections. In the districts with the smallest shares of black constituents, Democrats
never truly created a system of unchecked elections. In the most racially homogeneous districts,
competitive elections remained the norm into the mid twentieth century. If a subnational
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authoritarian regime was established, as of 1920, the regime was unable to consolidate power,
particularly in the most homoegneously white districts.
A final set of descriptive statistics relevant to democratic collapse are rates of voter
turnout. Landslide elections repeated year after year in favor of one party can still, theoretically,
produce responsive democratic governments. If, however, a one-party system is supported by only
a small portion of the electorate, then the result is obviously less democratic insofar as the
governments cannot be held accountable by a wide portion of the electorate. Figure 3 graphs the
average turnout rates grouped by the proportion of black constituents in the county. Counties
with the greatest proportion of blacks consistently report decreased rates of turnouts throughout
the period. The least racially diverse counties increased turnout until around 1895, at which point
all counties trend negatively.























Clearly, democratic elections, which were closely contested and drawing high turnout at
the end of Reconstruction, devolved into one-party rule, and for large portions of the electorate,
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authoritarianism. I now turn to the factors that shaped this transformation. The first set of
models listed in Table 2 present the effects of district-level characteristics on three dependent
variables: the share of the vote won by the Democratic or Democratic-equivalent candidate in the
election (Model 1), whether or not an election was decided by less than twenty five percent of the
vote (Model 2), and whether or not an election was contested (Model 3). Model 1 is an OLS
regression and Models 2 and 3 use logistic regression.
As expected, an increase in a district’s black population as a portion of their total
population corresponds to a greater share of the vote won by Democrats, decreasing probability of
a competitive election, and a decreasing probability of a contested election. Lynchings in a
district—lagged by a year—have a smaller but similar effect as an increase in the black
population. Greater racial concerns, and racial violence, correspond with less democratic elections.
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Table 2: DISTRICT LEVEL FACTORS ON CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
Dependent variable:
Democrat’s Vote Share Competitive Contested
OLS Logit Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Total Population −0.015 −0.163∗ 0.031
(0.035) (0.093) (0.066)
Proportion Urban 0.014 0.033 0.058
(0.022) (0.058) (0.041)
Proportion Black 0.334∗∗∗ −0.927∗∗∗ −0.424∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.119) (0.085)
Incumbent 0.056∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗
(0.007) (0.019) (0.013)
Proportion Enslaved (1860) −0.043∗∗ 0.046 −0.012
(0.018) (0.047) (0.033)
Proportion Owned Slaves (1860) 0.912∗∗∗ 0.348 0.767
(0.333) (0.875) (0.621)
Lynchings (lagged) 0.012∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Poll Tax 0.091∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.022) (0.016)
Australian Ballot −0.071∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.009) (0.023) (0.016)
Primary Election 0.043∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.030) (0.021)
1880-1889 0.038∗∗∗ 0.045 −0.039∗
(0.012) (0.031) (0.022)
1890-1899 0.035∗∗∗ 0.012 0.014
(0.012) (0.033) (0.023)
1900-1909 0.122∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.037) (0.026)
1910-1920 0.151∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.040) (0.029)
Observations 2,463 2,466 2,466
R2 0.389
Adjusted R2 0.386
Log Likelihood −1,344.372 −499.541
Residual Std. Error 0.159 (df = 2448)
F Statistic 111.429∗∗∗ (df = 14; 2448)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 4 graphs the results of Model 2 from Table 2, the logistic model measuring the
effect of district level factors on the competitiveness of congressional elections. The line plots the
predicted percent of congressional elections with margins smaller than 25 percent given a level of
district racial composition. The gray area shows the prediction space with a 95 percent confidence
interval. Although the small number of observations create a less certain prediction space near
the extremes (districts with nearly 0 percent or greater than fifty percent black populations), the
line shows that racially homogeneous districts had more consistently competitive elections than
districts with greater racial diversity.
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The variables measuring the historical legacy of slavery have significant results only in
Model 1. Interestingly, a higher proportion of enslaved population corresponds with a smaller
Democratic vote share, while a greater proportion of slave owners in a district corresponds with a
greater Democratic vote share. The controls for institutional reforms show that the poll tax and
primary election correspond with less democratic elections whereas the adoption of the secret
(Australian) ballot corresponds with more democratic elections. The dummy variables for each
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period of time indicate that elections generally became less democratic over time. From the
reference category of 1870-1879, elections became less competitive and less likely to be contested.
The models in Table 2 present the most basic analysis of the data. However, historical
accounts of the period suggest significant variation existing between the political systems
developed in each state. Across the states and elections years, there exists heterogeneity not
necessarily observed directly in the data—such as how the Readjuster Party in Virginia or the
Wilmington Insurrection in North Carolina affected elections in certain states and certain years,
but not others. To account for this unobserved heterogeneity I next estimate a series of multilevel
models.
Table 3 presents the results of a series of multilevel models that include random effects
grouped by state and election year. Although many of the effect sizes are smaller than the pooled
models presented in Table 1, I still find significant results for racial makeup of the district, the
historical legacy of slavery, and several institutional reforms in the expected directions. Even
controlling for heterogeneity between states and election years, I still find systematic effects of
these variables.
A greater proportion of black constituents corresponds with greater shares won by
Democratic candidates, fewer competitive elections, and fewer contested elections, though the
effect is largest for the competitive election dependent variable. Even in elections that were
contested in the districts with the greatest proportion of black residents, they were the least likely
to be competitive. The historical legacy of slavery effects, the proportion enslaved and proportion
owning slaves, do reach statistical significance in multilevel models using election competitiveness
as a dependent variable (these effects were not significant in the previous pooled model). The
effect for lynchings in a district remain significant, though the substantive effect is minimal.
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Similarly, the institutional reforms (poll tax, secret ballot, and primary election) do meet the
threshold for statistical significance, but the substantive effects are minimal.
Model 4 in Table 3 accounts for the number of manufacturing establishments in a
district (as a proportion of the total population), the rate of illiteracy in the district, and the
proportion of the farms in the district that were owner operated10. Overall, these district-level
factors indicate that levels of education and means of production did influence a district’s
susceptibility to the efforts of Redeemers. An increase in the number of manufacturing
establishments corresponds with an increase in the probability of an election being contested. A
higher concentration of non-agricultural economic production led to more democratic elections.
Districts with economies less dependent on agriculture, and the potential for greater organizing
among laborers, were less likely to produce non-competitive elections. Higher rates of illiteracy
also correspond with a higher probability that an election is competitive11. Although a lower-level
education is generally associated with a lower probability of voting, it is possible that illiteracy
made it easier for elites to buy votes or exploit a less informed electorate.
10The variables for the proportion of the district enslaved and proportion slave owning were left out of this
model to preserve the number of observations. Including both sets of variables does not change the effects
significantly.
11The proportion of manufacturing estbalishments and the proportion of the district that was illiterate
are not positively correlated.
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Table 3: MULTILEVEL FACTORS ON CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 1870-1920
Dependent variable:
Democrat’s Vote Share Competitive Contested Competitive
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population −0.021 −0.087 −0.001 0.021
(0.032) (0.087) (0.064) (0.084)
Prop. Urban 0.020 −0.014 0.100∗∗ −0.020
(0.020) (0.057) (0.041) (0.064)
Prop. Black 0.206∗∗∗ −0.589∗∗∗ −0.417∗∗∗ −0.811∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.142) (0.102) (0.080)
Incumbency 0.039∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.022∗ −0.099∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Prop. Enslaved −0.188∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.052) (0.037)
Prop. Owned Slaves 3.078∗∗∗ −2.230∗∗ −0.262
(0.348) (0.965) (0.688)
Lynchings (lagged) 0.009∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.010∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Poll Tax 0.076∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.034 −0.177∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.029) (0.021) (0.027)
Secret Ballot −0.050∗∗∗ 0.006 0.049∗∗ 0.018
(0.011) (0.030) (0.022) (0.029)
Primary −0.006 0.006 0.085∗∗∗ −0.004





Prop. Farms Owned 0.019
(0.103)
Constant 0.516∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.074) (0.054) (0.112)
Observations 2,463 2,466 2,466 2,251
Log Likelihood 1,299.084 −1,196.545 −399.762 −855.705
Akaike Inf. Crit. −2,570.169 2,421.090 827.524 1,741.410
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −2,488.841 2,502.435 908.869 1,827.197
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Figure 5 charts the average marginal effect of racial heterogeneity on the probability
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that a district has a contested congressional election. The average marginal effect refers
specifically to the average effect as measured across the groups controlled for in the analysis
(election year and state). The vertical lines intersecting the predicted average depict the
25th-75th range of predictions. The substantive effect is small but not negligible—districts with
the lowest levels of slaveholding are predicted to deliver less than 60 percent of their vote to
Democratic candidates. Voters in districts with an extremely high level of historic slaveholding
are predicted to deliver over seventy-five perent of their district’s vote to Democratic candidates.
Although the range of predictions overlap at most levels of slaveholding, the small difference is
substantively important. Contemporary elections are often considered competitive if the margin
of victory is less than ten percent. If the margin of victory is over twenty-five percent, as it is
predicted at the highest level of slaveholding, the election was not competitive.
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The findings depicted in Figure 5 support the theory that Redeemers would have been
most effective, and therefore receive the most support, in areas most disempowered by
Reconstruction. Districts with the highest concentration of slaveholders would have been the
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most advantaged by the antebellum hierarchies. Thus I find that in these districts, the
Democratic party, the political vehicle of Redemption, was most supported. Democrats found the
least fertile ground in the districts least dependent on slaveholding.
The results of the multilevel models also show a similar relationship between the
proportion of a district that is black and the probability of a contested election as the results from
the basic OLS models. A significant difference uncovered in the multilevel models, plotted in
Figure 6, is a greater level of uncertainty around the estimates. Controlling for year and state,
nearly all districts with total racial homoegeneity, completely white districts, had a greater than
fifty percent chance of a contested election. Nearly the exact opposite effect is true for districts
that are around fifty percent black or higher—that is, nearly all of these most heterogeneous
districts had a smaller than fifty percent chance of having a contested election. In contemporary
congressional elections, truly uncontested elections are rare. For example, only 17 congresspeople
ran completely unopposed in 2018. It is startling that in districts composed in large proportion
by blacks that the probability of a contested election would be less than fifty.
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These first two tables of models show that, in the aggregate, districts with larger black
voting constituencies were targeted for disenfranchisement. However, for a more nuanced
understanding of how particular groups of voters were targeted, why they were targeted, and how,
I turn to county-level data. County-level data allow for a more granular analysis of the role race,
economics, and institutional reforms played in the process of Redemption. County-level data also
improve on the ecological inference problems present in prior analyses (Key Jr., 1949; Kousser,
1974), which have primarily focused on state level races. It is especially important to consider
county-level data in this time period because many basic assumptions made about congressional
districts considered commonplace in contemporary congressional elections do not hold up during
this time period.
Most essentially, the basic cost of voting may have been much higher in certain counties
than in others (even if they were in the same district). Voters in especially rural counties may
have had to travel greater distances, over rough road and possibly without an automobile, just to
make it to a polling place. Voters in an urban portion of a district may only have had to walk a
short distance to make it to a polling place. Political communication would also have affected
counties within districts in different ways. For example, counties within a district not dependent
on a particular sector of the economy (e.g. coal, agriculture, oil) may have received different types
of political messaging than district that were. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, county-level
data simply allow for a more precise level of analysis with fewer people per county and more
counties per election year.
Table 4 presents a broad overview of the effects of racial factors, observed at the county
level, on congressional turnout—also measured at the county level. The models are estimated
using ordinary least squares and estimated separately by period to make the variation over time
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most comprehensible. The effect of varying black populations in a county was significant in all
time periods, though the sign and magnitude vary depending on the period of time. In the first
period, an increase in the proportion of black residents in a county corresponds with higher voter
turnout. In subsequent periods however, the sign flips and the effect magnitude doubles in size.
From 1880-1920, a decrease in the proportion of a county that is black corresponds with an
increase in voter turnout.
Interestingly, an increase in the proportion of a county that owned slaves has the exact
opposite effect as an increase as the black population. From 1870-1879, when an increase in black
population corresponds with an increase in turnout, an increase in the proportion of slave
ownership corresponds with a decrease in turnout. After this period, the relationship reverses,
counties with the greatest proportion of slave ownership became more likely to report higher
turnout until 1910, at which point the sign on the coefficient once again becomes negative. The
estimates for the effect of lynchings achieve statistical significance only for the 1890-1899 and
1900-1909 periods, the periods in which disenfranchisement occurred most fervently and thus
turnout decreased most precipitously. These periods are also those in which a higher proportion
of blacks in a county is associated with the largest decrease in turnout—indicating that lynching
became a tactic of Redeemers when blacks in the South were most aggressively disenfranchised.
The coefficients for the proportion of the population enslaved achieves statistical significant with
signs in the expected direction, though the effect is substantively minimal.
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Table 4: COUNTY LEVEL EFFECTS OF RACE ON TURNOUT
Dependent variable:
Congressional Turnout
1870-1879 1880-1889 1890-1899 1900-1909 1910-1920
Total Population 0.113 −0.201∗∗ −0.449∗∗∗ −0.383∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.088) (0.100) (0.059) (0.039)
Proportion Urban −0.221∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.050∗ −0.115∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.026) (0.021)
Proportion Black 0.324∗∗∗ −0.359∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗ −0.775∗∗∗ −0.678∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.031) (0.042) (0.029) (0.027)
Prop. Enslaved (1860) −0.008 −0.006 −0.017∗ −0.011 0.016∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Prop. Owned Slaves (1860) −0.666∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 1.126∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ −0.307∗
(0.249) (0.210) (0.281) (0.198) (0.183)
Lynchings (lagged) 0.037 −0.017 −0.037∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.535∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 4,204 4,337 3,810 3,735 3,905
R2 0.043 0.077 0.095 0.373 0.402
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.076 0.094 0.372 0.401
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
As with the basic pooled OLS models for the district-level data, heterogeneity between
counties, unobserved in the data, may skew results. For example, soil fertility, presence of valuable
mineral deposits, a dam, location on an important highway, etc. may all have long-term but
unobserved effects on elections, and politics generally, in some districts but not others. Table 5
presents the results of multilevel models with fixed-effects for election years and counties. Models
1 and 2 use voter turnout as a dependent variable, models 3 and four use the Democratic vote
share. The models present familiar patters, but the county-level analysis yields novel insights.
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An increased black proportion of a district corresponds with an increase in the
Democratic vote share, but a decrease in turnout overall. Given that the Democratic Party was, a
the time, explicitly motivated by goals antithetical to the goals of most blacks living in the South,
the data suggest that disenfranchisement targeted black voters specifically. Counties with more
potential black voters had disproportionately less turnout and disproportionately higher vote
shares for Democrats. Either black voters were kept from the polls or ballot boxes were
stuffed—while the data tell us nothing about which of these two possibilities is more
likely—elections administered in these counties clearly did not meet a basic qualification for being
considered democratic.
The coefficients for the proportion of the population that owned slaves suggests that in
counties where a greater portion of white residents owned slaves turnout was higher and more
consistently democratic. Slave ownership, conceptualized as an antebellum economic indicator of
wealth and status, suggests that wealthier whites, or at least counties with concentrated wealth
prior to the civil war and upending of the antebellum hierarchy, became more likely to report
higher turnout and support for Democrats. These counties, in which whites would have been
disproportionately wealthy and educated, were also unlikely to be kept from the polls, meaning
that the support for Democrats can be interpreted as genuine. The disenfranchising efforts of
Redeemers disproportionately aided those who benefited from the antebellum economic system of
racial hierarchy. Primary elections and the poll tax had a similar effect—decreasing overall
turnout, but increasing the Democratic vote share.
Interestingly, a greater proportion of a district working on farms is associated with
greater support for the Democratic Party. Although I touch on this point more directly later, the
Populist revolts in agricultural areas were clearly subverted by the Democrats—either by limiting
36
Table 5: COUNTY LEVEL ECONOMIC AND RACIAL EFFECTS ON ELECTIONS
Dependent variable:
Voter Turnout Democratic Vote Share
Total Population −0.186∗∗∗ 0.009 0.113∗ 0.106∗
(0.061) (0.067) (0.064) (0.062)
Proportion Urban −0.074∗∗∗ −0.034 −0.028 −0.011
(0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.023)
Proportion Black −0.307∗∗∗ −0.490∗∗∗ −0.030 0.209∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034)
Proportion Enslaved (1860) −0.009 −0.016∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Proportion Owned Slaves (1860) 0.395∗ 0.107 1.881∗∗∗ 1.659∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.257) (0.252) (0.273)
Lynching (lagged) −0.020∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Poll Tax −0.152∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Secret Ballot 0.005 0.034∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Primary Election −0.014∗∗ −0.015∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Proportion Farmers 0.112 0.835∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.097)
Proportion Illiterate 1.085∗∗∗ −1.355∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.066)
Manufacturing Establishments 2.505 1.379
(1.645) (1.461)
Observations 19,991 15,242 19,968 15,239
Log Likelihood 2,612.251 3,399.788 2,692.540 5,442.394
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −5,095.763 −6,645.467 −5,256.355 −10,730.680
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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their ability to reach voters or by co-opting the movements themselves. The proportion of the
population that was illiterate corresponds with an increase in turnout and decrease in Democratic
voteshare. This runs against expectation, it is counterintuitive that illiterate populations—those
less educated—would be voting at higher rates. Finally, I find no effect of an increased number of
non-agricultural manufacturing establishments on turnout or Democratic party share. The data
available suggest that the particular economic focus, be it agriculture or manufacturing, was less
important in the process of Redemption than racial consideration—-measured simply as
demographics or the legacy of slavery.
Turning to partisan considerations, the ways Redemption may have aimed to serve
partisan goals, its important to first consider how partisan incentives changed based upon the
specific elections. A primary consideration is whether or not the election took place in a
presidential-election year. Turnout rates are, in general, higher during presidential-election years
than midterm-election years. It may also be the case that the parties organized differently when a
presidential election was taking place simultaneously to a congressional election. Republicans,
hopeless in local elections, may still have organized for statewide and federal elections. Further,
federal election regulators may have been more effective in presidential election years, at least in
earliest elections after Reconstruction.
Modeling presidential and midterm elections separately reveals significant differences in
how democratic elections were subverted. The models presented in Table 6 all have fixed-effects
for the county and year. Whereas the black proportion of a county negatively affects the validity
of an election as expected—decreasing turnout and increasing the Democratic vote share—the
proportion of the county that owned slaves reveals a significant difference by election type. In
presidential elections, a county with a greater historical legacy of slavery was significantly more
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likely to have disproportionately higher turnout than in a midterm election.
Additionally, the impact of higher illiteracy rates on increasing turnout was nearly three
times as large in midterm-election than in presidential-election years. Counties with a greater
proportion of farmers turned out at higher rates in presidential-election years as well. This finding
makes sense, given that farmers likely were voters more distant from their polling place and
therefore less likely to turnout for midterm elections, for which turnout is generally lower. The
most dramatic difference in effect between election type comes from the number of manufacturing
establishments in a county (as a proportion of total population).
An increase in manufacturing establishments drove up turnout in presidential-election
years but was insignificant in midterm-election years. Further, a greater number of manufacturing
establishments increased Democratic vote share in presidential-election years, but decreased it in
midterm-election years. These findings are consistent with arguments that economic progressives
in the South, such as the labor movement, vigorously supported national democratic programs
(Katznelson and Mulroy, 2012; Katznelson, 2013, 2018). Local Democrats, often less supportive
of these policy programs, may have been less likely to turn out, or need to to turn out, these
voters. The same pattern is observed for a counties proportion of farmers, who turned out for
presidential but not midterm elections at disproportionately high rates.
The models in Table 6 address how partisan motivations change by election type, but
partisan motivations for Redemption may have also taken a more direct route—directly seeking to
disenfranchise portions of the electorate with strong turnout for non-Democratic candidates. To
model this, I have created two lagged variables. The first, the predictor of interest, is whether or
not a non-Democratic candidate ran a competitive campaign in the previous election. The
outcome of interest is the difference in turnout between the two elections. The theoretical
39
Table 6: COUNTY LEVEL FACTORS ON ELECTIONS BY ELECTION TYPE
Dependent variable:
Vote Turnout Democratic Vote Share
(Presidential) (Midterm) (Presidential) (Midterm)
Total Population −0.113 0.039 0.153∗∗ −0.006
(0.075) (0.079) (0.074) (0.083)
Proportion Urban −0.009 −0.098∗∗∗ −0.007 0.007
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.031)
Proportion Black −0.491∗∗∗ −0.456∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.041) (0.038) (0.042)
Proportion Enslaved (1860) −0.008 −0.018 −0.005 −0.022∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Proportion Owned Slaves (1860) 0.417∗ −0.345 1.447∗∗∗ 1.780∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.312) (0.279) (0.302)
Lynchings (lagged) −0.012∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.002 0.009∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Poll Tax −0.193∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Secret Ballot −0.026∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.062∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Primary Election 0.026∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Proportion Farmers 0.365∗∗∗ −0.030 0.718∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.125) (0.115) (0.132)
Proportion Illiterate 0.426∗∗∗ 1.357∗∗∗ −1.208∗∗∗ −1.190∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.086) (0.079) (0.091)
Manufacturing Establishments 8.102∗∗∗ 0.261 4.284∗∗ −6.826∗∗∗
(2.129) (1.943) (1.839) (2.110)
Observations 8,125 7,117 8,123 7,116
Log Likelihood 1,247.744 2,884.610 2,815.414 2,260.864
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −2,351.445 −5,627.297 −5,486.788 −4,379.807
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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expectation is that because Redeemers sought to disempower political movements competing with
the Democrats for power, elections in which non-Democrats performed particularly well ought to
be specifically targeted for voter suppression, ballot stuffing, etc.
Table 6 presents the results of a linear regression model with fixed effects for the county
and year of election. Controlling for racial and economic factors, the share of the vote won by the
non-Democratic candidate, typically a Republican but in certain cases a Populist or Greenbacker,
significantly affected the change in turnout. An increase in the share won by a non-Democratic
candidate corresponds to a decrease in overall turnout in the following election. Accounts
suggesting that Redeemers were often motivated to depress turnout in response to particularly
successful Republicans and Populists are correct—districts in which non-Democrats previously
did well experienced a disproportionately large decrease in turnout in the following election.
Thus far the poll tax, secret ballot, and primary election have been treated primarily as
controls. Although the secret ballot was adopted throughout the U.S., the white primary and poll
tax were reforms unique to the South. To understand their specific effect, they must be considered
in the specific contexts in which they were implemented. Generally, states implemented
institutional reforms after Democrats had won majorities in state legislatures—for this reason,
scholars typically argue that the enactments merely codified already accepted realities (Cash,
1941; Key Jr., 1949; Woodward, 1951; Webb, 2002). Yet, as the concerns of Governor Oates cited
earlier in this paper illuminate, the Redeemers recognized that these reforms came at a cost.
Namely, imposing restrictions on voting invited unwanted attention from the federal government.
Thus we are left with the question, if the institutional reforms carried a negative
consequence, why implement them at all? It could be the case that Redeemers truly believed
these reforms would disenfranchise black, poor, or poor and black voters. As one Louisiana
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Table 7: EFFECTS OF PARTISANSHIP MOTIVATION ON CHANGE IN TURNOUT
Dependent variable:
Change in County Level Turnout








Proportion Enslaved (1860) 0.004
(0.003)






















Akaike Inf. Crit. −10,704.320
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −10,567.820
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 8: DATES INSTITUTIONAL DISFRANCHISEMENT MECHANISMS ENACTED













a Poll tax imposed with literacy test
b Poll tax imposed with grandfather clause
convention delegate exclaimed, “Literacy Tests would be outmoded by negro education, but negro
poverty will last forever” (con, 1898). However, a quick surveying of the data indicates that if the
poll taxes and white primary did affect voter turnout, be it for partisan or racial motivations, the
effect would not be perceivable using even county level voting data.
In the year after the institutional reform enactments, both poll taxes and primary
elections, the rate of disenfranchisement—measured by decreasing turnout in counties in a given
state—was lower (slower) than it had been the previous year. To measure a perceivable
disenfranchising effect of institutional reforms, there would need to be a rate of
disenfranchisement higher (faster) than had been observed in the election year prior. To illustrate
this point, Figure 4 graphs the change in rate of disenfranchisement over the period of
Redemption, using five states selected at random as examples due to space constraints. Table 7
lists the dates of institutional enactments.
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Figure 7: AVERAGE TURNOUT IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 1870-1920





















































































































































As made evident in figure 7, the rates of disenfranchisement were actually moving closer
to 0 in the years poll taxes and primary elections were introduced. Certainly there are cases in
which particular voters were kept from the polls by the poll tax or white primary, but in the
aggregate, the rate at which disenfranchisement was occurring when these institutional changes
were made was already slowing—the floor had nearly been reached. Whatever the intentions of
those responsible for their enactments, by no means were the institutional changes accountable
for, in this period of time, a perceptible change in who could vote. As many before have argued
(Cash, 1941; Key Jr., 1949; Woodward, 1951; Webb, 2002), the changes were likely implemented
with an eye towards maintaining electoral majorities rather than establishing them.
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DISCUSSION
Why did Reconstruction fail to produce a two-party system? Why were the reforms of the
Reconstruction Era not more robust to the attempts of Redeemers to undo them? The data
provide several explanations. First, race unquestionably played a key role in shaping the collapse
of democratic elections in the South. Districts and counties with disproportionately high black
populations not only reported decreasing turnout faster than other locales, but also reported
higher rates of voting for Democrats—the political vehicle of disenfranchisement. Either the white
voters who maintained access to the polls were reliable Democrats, or these counties more
consistently engaged in ballot stuffing. It was in these districts, moreover, that voter suppression
and election stealing became the norm well before the state disenfranchising constitutional
conventions of the early 1900’s. Thus, hypothesis 1—the claim that institutional reforms were
only made by possible by the subversion of democratic elections in the first place—is supported.
In addition to being targeted earliest by disenfranchisers, counties and districts with
larger black populations continued to be the least likely to produce competitive or even contested
elections throughout the later periods in this study. Whether it was due to a more widescale
campaign of intimidation or genuine support for the Democratic party, a larger black population
led to less tolerance for open democratic elections. Even forty years after Reconstruction’s end,
these districts still did not produce competitive elections. Thus, my expectation for the efforts of
Redeemers to focus on disenfranchising blacks was confirmed. Districts with higher proportions of
black populations were made less competitive, and counties with higher black populations had
disproportionately lower turnout.
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The historical legacy of slavery also supports the hypothesis that a desire to restore the
antebellum hierarchies motivated much of the Redemption movement. Districts and counties with
the highest rates of slave ownership were the most relatively disadvantaged by Reconstruction.
Although this relative disadvantage stems from the mass level enfranchisement of other segments
of the population, it demonstrates why the impetus for Redemption existed in the first place.
Districts and counties with the highest rates of slave ownership went from being the most
depressed areas of turnout to the most disproportionately likely to be over-represented.
Additionally, the small but statistically discernible effect of lynchings on disenfranchisement and
increased vote share for Democrats suggests that racial violence did indeed serve the Redemption
movement. The data support my expectation that racial violence was used as a tactic to
discourage black political participation. The effects of the racial demography and lynchings in a
district support the claim made in hypothesis 2; Redeemers were motivated to focus on subverting
democratic elections in particular areas because of racial motivations.
The generally null findings for the proportion of a population that was formerly
enslaved carries major implications for work involving behavioral path dependency. Although the
null finding for the variable used in this line of research doesn’t necessarily suggest a limit to the
significance of the variable, research in this area, especially research about the historical legacy of
slavery, should incorporate levels of slave ownership given its important impact on politics. If
attitudes on race originated with slavery and transmitted through those descended from slave
owners, knowing where slave ownership existed is clearly as important as knowing where slavery
existed. My expectation for the effect of slavery’s historical legacy on disenfranchisement was not
confirmed. This finding suggests a direction for future work, specifically, how political
developments after an important historical event may influence behavioral path dependence.
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Partisan concerns also motivated Redemption. In years after Republicans or Populists
made serious challenges to Democrats, the counties which had previously supported those
counties experienced a larger decrease in turnout in subsequent elections compared to the turnout
decrease in counties that hadn’t supported a Republican or Populist. My expectation that efforts
to subvert democratic elections were motivated by partisan goals is confirmed by this finding.
However, the limits of the partisan motivation hypothesis are made evident by the limited effect
of the institutional reforms. Scholars who have argued that Redemption was motivated by
partisan goals (Kousser, 1974) have emphasized that the poll tax, in particular, targeted
non-Democratic voters. While possible, the evidence does not support the claim that the poll tax
disenfranchised anyone that had not already been barred from the polls. Thus, hypothesis 3 is
somewhat supported insofar as Redeemers did focus on subverting fair and free elections in
non-Democratic strongholds, but the effects of institutional reforms were not substantial.
While partisanship and race-based considerations may have driven Redemption,
southern resistance to expanding Federalism also shaped the changing nature of elections during
this period. As made evident by varying turnout rates between presidential and midterm election
years, the cotton belt and big-mule alliances of economic elites working against economic
progressives played an important role. In presidential election years, counties with the capacity to
support larger labor movements, those with a higher number of manufacturing establishments per
capita, were dramatically over-represented and likely to vote for Democrats. In midterm years,
those same counties were not over-repesented and were less likely to support a Democratic
candidate. The key difference was that the National Democratic Party endorsed broad progressive
economic policies beneficial to labor and manufacturing workers, whereas local Democrats often
found those policies anathema (Key Jr., 1949). Thus, these voters turned out enthusiastically to
support National Democrats, but not local politicians. While the data support hypothesis 4
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insofar as manufacturing establishments may have preserved democratic legitimacy by fostering
orgaznied labor movements, more specific research would be needed on presidential elections
during this period to make this finding conclusive.
Finally, a remaining question in the literatre this study helps to answer is whether the
South is better characterized as a regional system of sub-national authoritarianism (Gibson, 2013)
or one of scattered authoritarian enclaves (Mickey, 2015). The evidence in this study suggests
that Redemption emanated from enclaves of antebellum power. Although southern states may
have at times coordinated institutional reforms—several delegates attended multiple
constitutional conventions and served as ‘disenfranchisement consultants’—these reforms were not
effectual. Instead, locales with greater histories of slave ownership, fewer centers of
manufacturing, and greater racial violence supported Democrats. The continued presence of
competitive elections in mostly white areas suggests that a regional system of authoritarianism
was never truly established. Rather, the systems that did develop were disjointed regimes of
subnational authoritarianism, or in Mickey’s phrasing, enclaves of authoritarianism.
V.O. Key’s observations remain prescient. The states developed unique political
systems. What similarities they did have in the process of disenfranchisement are best understood
as a coincidence of interest regarding the subversion of black access to the ballot and desire to
assert Democratic control. While the states eventually began to borrow tactics, especially when
passing new state constitutions, the backsliding into authoritarianism was formed more by the
circumstances within the states than by any sort of coordination between them.
48
CONCLUSION
Progress towards political equality has not moved linearly in the United States. The success of
Reconstruction gave way to Redemption’s violent restoration of antebellum hierarchies. What
began as cases of election stealing and racially focused campaigns of terror and intimidation
evolved into multi-state efforts to restrict voting access. Minority factions used illegal tactics to
take governing control—once they had it, they passed legal measures of voter suppression to
consolidate their control. Throughout the entire process of Redemption, the Redeemers remained
cognizant of, but unencumbered by, the threat of federal intervention.
The mechanisms of federalism allowed Redeemers to subvert democracy at the state
level. Enacted as a safeguard for democracy, the administration of elections by the states
provided Redeemers ample opportunity to elect to office their preferred candidates—who could
then work to prevent the federal government from interfering in their elections. While the Voting
Rights Act (1965) revolutionized voting access by asserting the right of the federal government to
guarantee fair and free elections, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder,
570 U.S. 529 (2013), states once again assert more power in the administration of elections.
Political scientists have not reached a consensus on the effect of contemporary voting
laws effect on citizen’s capacity to vote. Scholars of voting rights laws and voter suppression have
been particularly interested in whether or not restrictions disproportionately burden non-white
voters. Researchers focusing on this question have produced contradictory claims that voter-id
laws do and do not disproportionately burden minorities (Hajnal et al., 2017; Grimmer et al.,
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2018; Hajnal et al., 2018).
As of 2020, 10 states have imposed strict voter-ID laws, and several state legislatures
are looking to increase restrictions in the near future (Underhill, 2019). Contemporary Voter-ID
laws are far less explicitly tied to racial disenfranchisement than the poll tax, but the underlying
principle, that any eligible voter can vote if they pay the necessary cost, is the same. In any
political context, an individual’s decision to vote can be understood as the result of a rational
choice—do the anticipated benefits of voting outweigh the costs of voting (Aldrich, 1993).
Although in nearly all conceivable cases a poll tax or instances of violence or intimiation
would impose a greater cost on an individual than acquiring an ID, the decision-making
framework remains constant over time. For this reason, understanding Redemption, how the right
to vote has been revoked in American history, is paramount.
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